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Consequentialist Reasons for Some Education Reforms 
Zdenko Kodelja1  
• The reasons for education reforms – as a particular form of social re-
forms – are either consequentialist or non-consequentialist. However, 
the reasons for the education reforms that are briefly discussed from 
the perspective of the philosophy of education in the present paper are 
above all consequentialist. These are the reasons for proposed educa-
tion reforms in EU countries whose strategic aim is equated with the 
enhancement of two values: creativity and innovation. It is supposed 
that these education reforms will have good effects and not that they are 
good in and of themselves. Therefore, although creativity and innova-
tion might be seen as having intrinsic value, they are – in these educa-
tion reforms – treated predominantly as instrumental values. It seems 
that the introduction of such education reforms can be understood as 
a decision founded not on causal explanation, but rather on the basis 
of a special type of teleological explanation, which has the logical form 
of a “practical syllogism”. In this case, the occurrence of an action is ex-
plained in terms of the goals and purposes of the agent; it shows that the 
agent did what s/he did because s/he tried to achieve a certain goal and 
believed that certain means were necessary or sufficient for achieving 
this goal.
 Keywords: education reforms, aims, instrumental values, creativity, 
innovation 
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Konsekvencialistični razlogi za nekatere reforme 
izobraževanja
Zdenko Kodelja
• Razlogi za reforme izobraževanja kot posebne oblike družbenih reform 
so konsekvencialistični ali nekonsekvencialistični. Razlogi za reformo 
izobraževanja, ki so na kratko obravnavani v tem prispevku z vidika fi-
lozofije vzgoje, so predvsem konsekvencialistični. To so razlogi za tiste 
predlagane reforme izobraževanja v državah EU, katerih strateški cilj je 
enačen s krepitvijo dveh vrednot: ustvarjalnosti in inovativnosti. Pri tem 
se predpostavlja, da bodo imele te reforme izobraževanja dobre učin-
ke, ne pa to, da so že same po sebi nekaj dobrega. Čeprav se mogoče 
zdi, da imata ustvarjalnost in inovativnost intrinzično vrednost, pa se 
v teh reformah izobraževanja obravnavata predvsem kot instrumental-
ni vrednoti. Zdi se, da uvedbe takšnih reform izobraževanja ni mogoče 
razumeti kot posledice odločitve, ki temelji na vzročni razlagi, ampak 
prej kot odločitev, ki temelji na posebni teleološki razlagi, ki ima logično 
formo »praktičnega silogizma«. V tem primeru je neko dejanje poja-
snjeno z vidika ciljev in namenov akterja; kaže, da je akter storil to, kar je 
storil, zato ker je poskušal doseči določen cilj in je verjel, da so določena 
sredstva nujna ali zadostna za dosego tega cilja.
 Ključne besede: reforme izobraževanja, cilji, instrumentalne vrednote, 
ustvarjalnost, inovacije
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Introduction
Education reforms are a particular form of social reforms. According to 
Jon Elster, there are essentially two types of reasons for social reforms. Some 
are consequentialist, grounded in a belief that the reform will have good or de-
sirable effects, while others are deontological, based on the conviction that the 
reform is a good thing in and of itself (Elster, 1987, p. 709). However, the reasons 
for some of the education reforms – or their constitutive elements – that I dis-
cuss briefly in this paper from the perspective of the philosophy of education 
are above all consequentialist. It is supposed that these education reforms in 
EU countries – one of whose strategic aims is equated with the enhancement of 
two values: creativity and innovation – will have good effects: improving “en-
terprise development and Europe’s ability to compete internationally” (Council 
of Europe, 2009, p. 3), and not that they are good in and of themselves. Moreo-
ver, although it might seem that creativity and innovation have intrinsic value, 
they are – in these education reforms – treated predominantly as instrumental 
values. Therefore, even if such education reforms, which are only a means to 
achieve the desired goals, have good consequences, their value is mostly instru-
mental. However, there is no guarantee that the introduced reforms will achieve 
the desired goals, because reforms and goals are not necessarily in a causal rela-
tionship; reformers as decisionmakers can merely believe in such a connection 
when they decide to introduce such reforms. If this is so, then the introduction 
of such education reforms can be understood on the basis of a special type of 
teleological explanation, which has the logical form of a “practical syllogism”. 
In this case, the decision to introduce education reforms is explained in terms 
of the goals and purposes of those who made the decision. This means that 
they did what they did because they tried to achieve a certain goal and believed 
that certain means were necessary or sufficient for achieving this goal.2 In the 
present paper, the education reforms are intended as a means to achieve two 
goals: “enhancement of creativity and innovation” in all students, on the one 
hand, and improving “enterprise development and Europe’s ability to compete 
internationally”, on the other. However, the means proposed in EU documents 
(such as changes in curricula and teacher training) to achieve the first goal will 
not be discussed here.3 
2 At this point, I leave aside the question of whether intention itself can be the cause of action, as 
causalists think, or whether the connection between intention and action is purely conceptual and 
logical in nature, as intentionalists think (Von Wright, 1971, pp. 39–53).
3 Among the means that are presumed to make it possible to achieve this goal (“enhancement of 
creativity and innovation” in all students) are, for instance, mentioned and discussed changes in: 
curricula, teacher training, pedagogy and assessment, use of ICT and digital media, educational 
culture and leadership (Cachia et al., 2010, pp. 9–11). 
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Creativity and innovation as instrumental values that 
constitute an important aim of one of the proposed 
education reforms in the EU
One of the strategic and, as such, most important aims of EU education 
policies since 2009 has been: “Enhancing creativity and innovation, including 
entrepreneurship, at all levels of education and training” (Council of Europe, 
2009, p. 3).4 Since educational aims are understood as values that education 
should aim for, and since values are values just because they are something 
good or are thought to be good,5 it seems to be reasonable to conclude that 
enhancing creativity and innovation was declared as a strategic aim because 
creativity and innovation were seen as something so good that enhancing them 
deserves to be a strategic aim. The question is, however, whether they were 
chosen as one of the strategic aims because of their intrinsic or extrinsic value. 
For the purpose of the present paper, this is certainly a very important question. 
However, it might be seen as a problematic question as well. Why? Because 
it already presupposes that creativity and innovation can have intrinsic value. 
This presupposition is wrong in two cases: firstly, if there is not at all such a 
thing that has intrinsic value; and secondly, if only one thing, which is neither 
creativity nor innovation, can have such value.
Philosophers who have serious doubts about the idea of intrinsic value, 
or even reject it, belong to different philosophical traditions and use different 
arguments to justify their doubts and objections to the widely accepted theory 
that the intrinsic goodness of something is a genuine property of that thing. 
4 Innovation and education were already considered as a means to achieve a key goal (“knowledge 
society”) established by the EU in 2000, in the Lisbon Strategy. In 2009, the European Commis-
sion declared the “European Year of Creativity and Innovation” in order to promote creativity and 
innovation as key skills of all individuals “through formal and non-formal education”. The main 
aim was “to create an environment that is conducive to all forms of creativity and innovation, 
whether artistic, cultural, social or technological, and to promote the practical use of knowledge 
and ideas” (EUR LEX, 2008). The Commission also stressed “the importance of encouraging cre-
ativity and innovation within education and training systems, which are themselves essential to 
the proper functioning of the knowledge triangle (education-research-innovation)”. According to 
the Commission, that year “should lead to in-depth reflexion on the teaching methods and means 
of assessing learning achievements. Motivation and a sense of initiative at the heart of creativity 
and innovation should be further developed throughout the educational pathway of young and 
not-so-young people alike” (ibid.). Entrepreneurship, as defined in the EU documents, “refers to 
an individual’s ability to turn ideas into action. It includes creativity, innovation and risk taking, 
as well as the ability to plan and manage projects in order to achieve objectives”. As such, it is seen 
as a “key competence for growth, employment and personal fulfilment”, which should be acquired 
throughout education from primary schools to university and lifelog learning (EUR LEX, 2006). 
5 Th is claim seems to be justifi ed at least in the context of philosophical theories of values that de-
fine them as “things that are good”. William K. Frankena, for instance, says that utility values are 
“things that are good because of their usefulness for some purpose”; extrinsic values are “things 
that are good because they are means to what is good”; intrinsic values are “things that are good in 
themselves or good because of their own intrinsic properties”, and so on (Frankena, 1973, ch. 5).
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“Especially well known for their dissent are Thomas Hobbes”, “who believed the 
goodness or badness of something to be constituted by the desire or aversion 
that one may have regarding it, and David Hume,” “who similarly took all as-
criptions of value to involve projections of one’s own sentiments onto whatever 
is said to have value” (Zimmerman, 2010). Later, similar arguments were used 
by the so-called “non-cognitivists”. Among them we can find both emotivists 
and prescriptivists, who argue that there are no moral properties or moral facts 
and, therefore, that judgments about goodness and badness are not descrip-
tive statements about the moral properties of a certain thing, but rather either 
expressions or evocations of feeling and attitude, or something that constitutes 
a kind of command as to how we are to act. This means that a claim that some-
thing is good is not a statement about that thing, which can be true or false, but 
an ascription of value to it, which can be neither true nor false, since it is an ex-
pression of feelings, attitudes, evaluations, recommendations or prescriptions.6 
However, there are also other kinds of arguments that have been used for 
defending the idea that nothing has intrinsic value.7 If we accept them, then it is 
obvious that the previously asked question – whether creativity and innovation were 
chosen as one of the strategic aims of EU education policies because of their intrinsic 
or extrinsic value – is illogical and nonsensical. The same could be said if the claim 
that only one thing can have intrinsic value were true, under the condition, of course, 
that for those who defend this claim, creativity or innovation is not such a thing. 
According to Kant, for instance, the only thing that is intrinsically good 
or, in other words, good in itself, that is, good independently of its relation 
to other things, is a good will; Kant argues that the only thing “which can be 
regarded as good without qualification”, that is, as unconditionally good, is “a 
good will”. A good will is, therefore, good not because of its consequences, but 
“in itself ” (Kant, 2004, pp. 63–64).8 This does not mean that other things can-
not be good, but that they are not good in all circumstances, and “can also be 
extremely bad and hurtful when the will is not good” (Ibid., p. 63).
6 Referential authors are, for example, Charles L. Stevenson, among emotivists, and Richard M. 
Hare, among prescriptivists.
7 Monroe Beardsley, for instance, claims that all value is extrinsic and that nothing has intrinsic 
value (Beardsley, 1965, pp. 1–17).
8 Since only rational beings can have a good will, and good will is the only unconditional good, they 
have unconditional or, in other words, absolute value. As such, rational beings are an end in them-
selves and “not merely a means for arbitrary use by this or that will” (Kant, 2004, pp. 105–107). For 
this reason, they must treat one another as ends in themselves. In other words, just because they 
are ends in themselves, they “serve the will as a subjective ground of its self-determination” (Ibid., 
pp. 104–105). Since “the will is conceived as a power of determining oneself to action in accord-
ance with the idea of certain laws”, it follows that the law that determines the will is the categorical 
imperative formulated as: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an 
end” (Ibid., pp. 106–17).  
consequentialist reasons for some education reforms116
Another theory according to which only one thing is intrinsically good is he-
donism. Hedonism is usually interpreted as the ethical theory that defends the idea 
that “there is one thing, and one thing only, that is intrinsically good, namely pleas-
ure” (Ross, 2002, p. 99). However, George E. Moore totally disagrees with such an in-
terpretation. In his opinion, hedonistic utilitarianism “does not assert that pleasure is 
the only thing intrinsically good. … On the contrary, it asserts that any whole which 
contains an excess of pleasure over pain is intrinsically good” (Moore, 1912, p. 73). It 
seems that this interpretation of hedonism, as opposed to the first one, allows the 
conclusion that creativity and innovation, too, can have an intrinsic value if a whole 
– let us say a creative and innovative job – contains an excess of pleasure over pain. 
In addition to this interpretation of hedonism, there is a variety of other 
philosophical theories that reject the idea that one and only one thing can be 
intrinsically good. In fact, these theories are widely accepted. As a result, there 
are different lists of things that are – or are supposed to be – intrinsically good,9 
including creativeness (White, 1982, p. 9). Even if this is not a proof of their exist-
ence, it is at least proof that several philosophers argue that things that are intrin-
sically good exist. To discuss the arguments for and against their existence would 
exceed the purpose of this paper. The main purpose of this paper is to show that 
creativity and innovation in the context of EU education policies have instru-
mental value and that the very aim of education is not “enhancing creativity and 
innovation”, but rather improving “enterprise development and Europe’s ability 
to compete internationally” and “engendering personal fulfilment” (Council of 
Europe, 2009, p. 3). In order to justify this thesis, it is enough to quote the first 
part of the explanation of the aforementioned strategic aim, where it is stated: “As 
well as engendering personal fulfilment, creativity constitutes a prime source of 
innovation, which in turn is acknowledged as one of the key drivers of sustain-
able economic development. Creativity and innovation are crucial to enterprise 
development and to Europe’s ability to compete internationally” (Ibid.).10
9 The most known is the following classical list of intrinsic goods: truth, goodness and beauty. One of the 
longest lists of intrinsic goods is that given by William Frankena, which includes: life, consciousness, 
and activity; health and strength; pleasures and satisfactions of all or certain kinds; happiness, beatitude, 
contentment, etc.; truth; knowledge and true opinions of various kinds, understanding, wisdom; beauty, 
harmony, proportion in objects contemplated; aesthetic experience; morally good dispositions or vir-
tues; mutual affection, love, friendship, cooperation; just distribution of goods and evils; harmony and 
proportion in one’s own life; power and experiences of achievement; self-expression; freedom; peace, 
security; adventure and novelty; and good reputation, honour, esteem, etc. (Frankena, 1973, pp. 87–88). 
10 The fact that EU politicians understand and treat creativity and innovation as instrumental values 
is also evident in the explication of the Conference Theme of this ECER Conference: “National gov-
ernments and the European Union see innovation as increasingly important for the development of 
the 21st century knowledge society. It may contribute to economic prosperity as well as to social and 
individual wellbeing and may, therefore, be an essential factor for creating a more competitive and 
dynamic European society. In the effort to manage the challenges facing societies and economies, 
political agencies and systems expect educational research, the social sciences and humanities to 
find solutions for developing creative and innovative education as a means to foster creative compe-
tences and innovative skills among the next generation” (Conference Theme, ECER 2013).
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What follows from this explanation is that in this context, both creativ-
ity and innovation have predominantly – if not only – instrumental value. This 
means that both are supposed to be something good not because of their intrin-
sic properties, but rather because they lead to other good things (Kant, 2004, 
p. 4): “personal fulfilment”, “enterprise development, and to Europe’s ability to 
compete internationally”. Since creativity and innovation have a value only in 
virtue of being a means to an end, they are instrumental values. However, al-
though they are both instrumental values, there is a difference between them: 
innovation, as a matter of fact, is an end to which creativity is a means.11 Despite 
this, both have instrumental values since innovation is not an end in itself, but 
rather a means to an end, which – in this case – is, as we have already seen, 
“enterprise development, and Europe’s ability to compete internationally”. Now, 
the question is whether this end is an end in itself or only a means to another 
end. This is an important question for two reasons. Firstly, if this end (“en-
terprise development and Europe’s ability to compete internationally”) is not 
something that is valuable for its own sake but for the sake of something else to 
which it is related as a means to another end, then innovation has instrumental 
value only if this other end (the one that is the final end in the given means-end 
relation) has intrinsic value. For, according to some interpretations, there can 
be no instrumental value without intrinsic value. Secondly, if the statement “in-
novation has instrumental value” means “innovation is conducive to something 
that has intrinsic value”, then it follows that intrinsic value exists.12
Therefore, if things can have intrinsic value, then creativity and innova-
tion can have it as well. Moreover, if they can have intrinsic value, then it would 
be possible that creativity and innovation were chosen as the strategic aim of 
EU education policies because of their intrinsic goodness. Since they were not – 
or better to say, there is no evidence in the aforementioned EU documents that 
they were – it seems to me reasonable to conclude that they were intentionally 
chosen because of their instrumental value.
If this conclusion is correct, then the substantial part of the subtitle of 
this paper “Creativity and Innovation as Instrumental Values”, can be under-
stood in two different ways: as a statement of fact, which is either true or false, 
and as a value judgment, which is expressed as an implicit critique in the sense 
that creativity and innovation are treated only as instrumental values. Needless 
11 Innovation is defined as “to introduce change in society and in the economy”, and creativity as “to 
imagine something that did not exist before and to look for new solutions and forms” (Manifesto 
for Creativity and Innovation in Europe).
12 Beardsley rejects such interpretations and argues that the existence of at least one intrinsic value is 
not a necessary condition for the existence of instrumental values. In his view, what is necessary is 
to accept the following definition: “X has instrumental value” means “X is conducive to something 
that has value” (Beardsley, 1965, p. 64).
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to say, this kind of critique is only possible if there are intrinsic values and if 
creativity and innovation have intrinsic value. And the opposite: if those who 
deny either the existence of things that are intrinsically good or claim that only 
one thing can have intrinsic value are right, then such critiques are absurd. It 
would be illogical to criticize and blame EU politicians for treating creativity 
and innovation only as a means if they cannot be anything more than that. 
On the other hand, it seems to me that this critique is in some way justi-
fied even if some philosophers are in considerable doubt about intrinsic values, 
since there is no sign at all that politicians in the EU treat creativity and inno-
vation as means because they know or believe that intrinsic values are impos-
sible, and they therefore treat them in the only possible way, that is, as a means. 
More plausible seems to be the assumption that they think that intrinsically 
valuable things exist, but, despite this, treat creativity and innovation as if they 
cannot have intrinsic value. And the opposite: some formulations in EU docu-
ments give the impression that they treat some other things, such as economic 
growth and the competitiveness of Europe, as if they were ends in themselves. 
Consequently, education, too, is treated by politicians primarily as a means of 
improving the economic situation in the EU, by helping to provide the kinds of 
workers that are equipped with the kind of competences that involve creativity 
and the ability for innovation. For this reason, it is perhaps worth repeating 
what Alasdair MacIntyre critically said in his famous article ‘Against Utilitari-
anism’ already half a century ago. He emphasised “that education should not 
aim only at instrumental goods – access to jobs, increased industrial produc-
tion, increased consumption of goods and services, which in turn keeps up 
production, and so on”, since a society and its education system that pursue 
“only means, without paying attention to any ultimate ends which these means 
might bring about”, are irrational (MacIntyre, 1964, pp. 8–9; White, 1982, p. 14).
However, the question is not only whether creativity and innovation 
have – in the discussed EU document – predominantly intrinsic or instrumen-
tal value, but also whether enhancement of creativity and innovation – as a 
strategic aim of EU education policies – is in a causal relationship to “enterprise 
development and to Europe’s ability to compete internationally”, which seems 
to be the real goal of such education reforms. It is possible that reformers, that 
is, decisionmakers, only believe that creativity and innovation are in causal re-
lation, and that their decision is based on the conclusion followed from the 
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so-called “practical syllogism” or “practical inference”,13 which has the logical 
form: (1) A wants B. (2) A believes that B will not occur unless he does C. (3) 
Therefore, A does C. 
A practical syllogism is a teleological explanation that explains the occur-
rence of an action in terms of the goals and purposes of the agent; it shows that an 
agent did what he did because he tried to achieve a certain goal and believed that 
certain means were necessary and/or sufficient for achieving this goal. 
In our case, the introduction of such an education reform can be ex-
plained in the following way: (1) Reformers would like to achieve the previous-
ly mentioned goals (“enterprise development and Europe’s ability to compete 
internationally”); (2) Reformers believe that these goals will be achieved only 
if they themselves introduce the education reform (whose aim is: “Enhancing 
creativity and innovation, including entrepreneurship, at all levels of education 
and training”); (3) Therefore, reformers introduce such an education reform. 
What should be stressed here is that we do not know whether the intro-
duction of the education reform will enable the achievement of the intended 
goal, since, for the teleological explanation, it is not important at all whether 
the means (education reform) is in causal relation with the goal or not. The 
only thing that is important is that the reformers believe that the introduction 
of the education reform is necessary for achieving the intended goal. A similar 
understanding, that is, in accordance with the theory of practical syllogism, can 
be applied to the previously discussed education reform proposed by the EU 
and aimed at the enhancement of creativity and innovation, which is, in fact, a 
means to a further aim: “enterprise development and to Europe’s ability to com-
pete internationally”. This seems to be the real aim of such education reforms.
Nonetheless, such teleological explanation does not solve one of the key 
problems related to the consequentialist arguments for social reform, which 
is, as Elster argues, that it is difficult “to assess before the fact what the conse-
quences will be of a reform” (Elster, 1987, p. 710). Education reformers also face 
this problem: How can they know what the consequences of their decision will 
be? In fact, they cannot know in advance whether the consequences of intro-
ducing education reform will be better than they would have been if the reform 
13 Von Wright explicitly links his theory of the practical syllogism to the work of Aristotle and also 
to that of Elizabeth Anscombe (von Wright 1971, pp. 26–27; cf. Anscombe, 1963). However, Ans-
combe (1989) claims that von Wright’s so-called ‘practical inference’ is not practical at all. What 
von Wright calls ‘practical inference’ is a theoretical inference put to a practical use. The inference 
(I): X intends p; X believes that p implies q; Therefore, X intends q is not a special form of infer-
ence. The only real logical inference involved in (I) is the purely theoretical inference (modus 
ponens): (MP) p; p implies q: Therefore q. An agent might put MP to practical use by reasoning 
from his intention to obtain p to q as the sufficient means, but this practical use of MP does not 
amount to a new form of inference (1989, p. 390).
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had not been introduced. Only after recalculating the positive and negative 
consequences can it be determined whether their decision was justified or not. 
Even then, a question remains: How can we know if they made the right deci-
sion if we need to know the consequences of their decision and compare them 
to the consequences that would have arisen if they had decided otherwise?
Conclusion 
The discussion so far – which has been limited to treating creativity and 
innovation as instrumental values and at the same time as objectives of edu-
cation reforms aimed at increasing the competitiveness of EU countries in the 
global market – needs to be understood in a broader framework of neoliberal 
policies. In this neoliberal context, which was also characteristic of EU policies 
at the time, education is not seen only as a precondition for developing creativity 
and innovation, but also as a key element of the nation state’s ability to improve 
or maintain economic prosperity. Furthermore, the need for education reforms 
is, in the neoliberal context, mainly justified by economic reasons, especially 
the need to provide a more educated and more creative, innovative and flexible 
workforce that will enable the nation state to compete successfully in the global 
market. Such arguments have so often appeared in the EU and some other inter-
national documents, as well as in the government programmes of many coun-
tries, that nowadays they seem almost self-evident. Some decades ago, however, 
the reasons why politicians decided to reform education were quite different.14 
Social mobility and the well-being of individuals were much more important at 
that time. However, these differences only prove that there are different priori-
ties; they do not prove that economic reasons are considered as the only reasons 
for education reforms today. Equity, social cohesion and active citizenship, for 
instance, are still cited as goals of education reforms (Council of Europe, 2009, 
 
 
14 Such a conclusion seems to be at least partly confirmed by the review of education reforms in 
European countries in the last century. In addition, it also seems that creativity and innovation 
did not play a significant role in the education reforms of that time, that is, until 2009 (Garrouste, 
2010). On the other hand, the 2010 research report on a project that started in December 2008 
already shows a shift in the emphasis on creativity and innovation in education in EU countries. 
This study, for instance, “shows that the terms ‘creativity’, and ‘innovation’ and their synonyms are 
mentioned relatively often in the EU27 curricula”. However, “many teachers and education experts 
… feel that the curricula in their countries do not, as yet, sufficiently encourage creativity and in-
novation, mainly because they are not clear how creativity should be defined and how it should 
be treated in learning and assessment”. In addition, “curricula are often overloaded with content, 
which reduces the possibilities of creative and innovative learning approaches in practice” (Cachia 
et al., 2010, p. 9).
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p. 3).15 What has changed is that among the reasons that politicians and reform-
ers use to justify education reforms, economic reasons are undoubtedly the most 
important (Levin, 1998, pp. 131–132). 
Consequently, the understanding of creativity and innovation has 
changed, as well. Creativity, for instance, has a long history as both a term and 
a concept in the fields of European art, philosophy and theology (Tatarkiewicz, 
1980, pp. 244–265).16 Something similar can also be said for the concept of in-
novation, whose meaning has changed throughout history and in accordance 
with its different definitions in scientific, technological, humanistic, economic 
and managerial literature (Godin, 2008). For the purpose of the present pa-
per, it might be useful to mention that innovation has not always been seen as 
something good, that is, as a value.17 Nowadays, however, creativity and innova-
15 However, the question is whether the stated goals are compatible with each other. Is, for example, 
“active citizenship” compatible with “entrepreneurship”, that is, with the neoliberal conception of 
man as “human capital” or as a “self-entrepreneur” (cf. Laval, 2018, pp. 55–58), if active citizen-
ship is a characteristic of a political man? Wendy Brown (who extended Foucault’s analysis of 
neoliberalism to the issue of democracy) claims that “as humans become capital for themselves, 
but also for others, for a firm or a state, their investment value, rather than their productivity, 
becomes paramount; moral autonomy and hence the basis of sovereign individuality vanishes; 
and the space and meaning of political citizenship shrink” (Brown, 2015, p. 78). Moreover, one 
of the consequences of neoliberalism is the replacement of the political man (homo politicus) by 
the economic man (homo oeconominus). This “neoliberal triumph of homo oeconomicus as the 
exhaustive figure of the human is undermining democratic practices and a democratic imaginary 
by vanquishing the subject that governs itself through moral autonomy and governs with others 
through popular sovereignty. The argument is that economic values have not simply supersatu-
rated the political or become predominant over the political. Rather, a neoliberal iteration of homo 
oeconomicus is extinguishing the agent, the idiom, and the domains through which democracy 
– any variety of democracy – materializes” (Ibid., p. 79).
16 The concept of creativity appears “only at the very end of antiquity: specifically, in the sense of 
fashioning something from nothing. But the initial view of creativity was a negative one; it held 
that there is no creativity” (Ibid., p. 251) because creation de nihilo, as Lucretius argued, does not 
exist. In Mediaeval theology, the existence of creativity (understood as creatio ex nihilo) was af-
firmed by the idea of God as a creator. In the nineteenth century, “the concept of creativity was 
transformed” radically and “the meaning of the expression changed” because “the requirement 
‘from nothing’ was dropped. Creativity in the altered construction became the making of new 
things rather than the making of things from nothing” (Ibid.). Although “not every novelty suf-
ficed for creativity”, “in the end it was novelty that defined creativity. With the new concept, a new 
theory arose: creativity was an exclusive attribute of the artist” and “the artist alone is a creator” 
(Ibid.). However, “in the 20th the idea has arisen that … not only artists but persons active in 
other departments of culture may likewise be creative. Creativity is possible in all fields of human 
production” because “novelty occurs in works not only of art but likewise of science and technol-
ogy” (Ibid., p. 254).
17 Just the opposite: “innovation was pejorative for a while. Until the eighteenth century, a “novator” 
was still a suspicious person, one to be mistrusted. Before the twentieth century, there had been 
two episodes in history where innovation was opposed. The first was in political and religious 
matters. Because of tradition, political change was negatively received, and because of orthodoxy, 
innovation was considered heresy; thereafter innovation was identified with the introduction of 
anything deviant in political affairs and in the Church. The second episode was during the eight-
eenth century, when inventors started making money from their inventions. Projectors, as the 
innovators were then called, became objects of satire by many authors because of insufficient 
science, bad management and fraud” (Ibid., p. 24).
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tion are seen as very important values. They are predominantly understood as 
different but interrelated concepts. Creativity is seen as the process of develop-
ing and expressing novel ideas, knowledge and practices, while innovation is 
viewed as the practical implementation of these ideas, knowledge and practices 
in new products or services that create economic value. Conceived in such a 
way, creativity is, as previously discussed, a means and not an end. As such, it 
primarily has an instrumental value: it is valued first and foremost because it 
is a necessary condition for innovation. However, not only creativity but also 
innovation has an instrumental value, because it, too, is a means to an end. This 
is evident from the explanation of innovation as “harnessing creativity for busi-
ness growth” (Jolly, 2003), as well as from the aforementioned real reason for 
introducing education reform (which emphasises the enhancement of creativ-
ity and innovation in education): “enterprise development and Europe’s ability 
to compete internationally”. In the neoliberal context, however, innovation is 
not only a personal skill and, therefore, something that should be enhanced “at 
all levels of education and training” in “an environment that is conducive to all 
forms of … innovation, whether artistic, cultural, social or technological” – as 
stated in the previously discussed EU documents – but is, according to Luc 
Ferry, the essence of neoliberal capitalism, as well. The latter’s philosophical 
reinterpretation of the idea of innovation as a source of capitalism defined as 
“creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942) into a concept of “destructive inno-
vation” reveals the paradoxical nature of the permanent process of innovation, 
which destroys the present in order to create the future. From this perspective, 
neoliberal capitalism is seen as something that forces us to submit to the per-
petual logic of innovation for the sake of innovation, which not only leads to 
progress in economic and some other areas, but also to the incessant “rupture 
with all the forms of heritage, patrimony, and tradition” (Ferry, 2014, p. 14). It 
is precisely this deconstructive side of the innovation process that seems to be 
overlooked or deliberately silenced when innovation, along with creativity, is 
established as the goal of social and education reforms. 
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